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Arnold R. Isaacs, Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia.
Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1983. 559 pp.
$19.95.
r
Review by Paul Siff
Over a decade since the United States withdrew from combat in
Vietnam, and nearly that long since the North Vietnamese triumphed
in the South, the lessons of American involvement are still being
pondered and debated. The Reagan Administration's Central
American policy, which defines that area as crucial to United States
interests and does not preclude armed intervention, increases the
urgency to explain and understand the American defeat in Southeast
Asia. In 1980 candidate Ronald Reagan pronounced the U.S. effort
"in truth, a noble cause," and later, as president, he claimed that
American troops there "were denied permission to win." The
implication is clear: in Reagan's mind a military victory was both
desirable and possible. Might it not be so in Nicaragua or El
Salvador?
Arnold Isaacs' book Without Honor should lay to rest wishful
fantasies about an American triumph in Vietnam. Isaacs, the
Baltimore Sun's Indochina war correspondent from 1972 to 1975, has
written a fascinating chronicle of American failure, not only in
Vietnam but in Laos and Cambodia as well. It is rich in personal
experience, compelling in detail, well documented, and judicious in
its conclusions. While Isaacs makes clear the follies and dismal
misperceptions of U.S. policy-makers, he has little praise for the
other principals. "Without honor" can well serve as a collective
judgment on all sides in the conflict.
Isaacs begins his account with the 1972 Paris peace talks between
North Vietnam and the United States, and the manner in which
South Vietnamese President Thieu, kept in the dark and clearly
alarmed by the prospect of a cease-fire and American withdrawal,
temporarily sabotaged the peace which, in Henry Kissinger's words,
was "at hand." This turn of events led Kissinger to renege on his
already-concluded agreements with the North Vietnamese, and
Isaacs judges him harshly, characterizing Kissinger as a man who
"deceived both his enemy and his ally and . . . led the United States
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into an act of bad faith that can have few parallels in its diplomatic
history." There soon followed both a huge military buildup and
transfer of supplies in South Vietnam, destined to evade the
provisions of the peace agreements, and the infamous Christmas
bombing of Hanoi, the North Vietnamese capital. Finally, a ceasefire agreement was reached. Many Americans, including military
leaders, came to believe that the intensive bombing had forced Hanoi
into making peace; they therefore concluded that the war could have
been won earlier by the same tactics. Isaacs disagrees, pointing out
that the peace terms signed in January 1973, envisioning a political
settlement of the conflict, were substantially those of the previous
October. No significant concessions had been wrested from the
communists. Neither side, however, was genuinely committed to
observance of the peace agreements. Each, distrusting the other,
attempted to strengthen its position just prior to the cease-fire, and
the fighting continued thereafter. It was, observed one American
officer, "the end of the second Indochina war and the beginning of the
third." Meanwhile, the villagers of South Vietnam continued their
fatalistic suffering at the hands of government and communists alike.
The Viet Cong practiced assassination; the government's soldiers
looted, raped, and casually shot civilians in the aftermath of battle.
The government of President Thieu, relying on military strength for
its survival, persisted in disdaining its citizens; corruption, the
regime's "fatal flaw," undermined both civilian and military life.
But while the fighting continued into 1973, one element changed:
on March 29 the last Americans departed, bringing to an end the
United States's protracted and inglorious direct involvement. Thereafter, American interest in, and commitment to, South Vietnam
faded fast, despite President Nixon's secret assurance of continued
U.S. support, assurances which Congress and a succeeding administration would find it convenient to ignore. Unfortunately, perhaps
the most enduring American legacy in South Vietnam was the
fashioning of an army both wasteful of and pathetically dependent
upon an unlimited flow of American supplies. No adjustment was
made for the possible diminution or cessation of such a flow. Worse,
U.S. officials encouraged a belief on Saigon's part that American air
power would be available against major enemy attacks, and this
belief persisted even after the enactment of a Congressional bombing
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ban. All of this, Isaacs suggests,helped commit the South Vietnamese
government to a grandiose strategy of defending every square inch of
the country, a task clearly impossible without U.S. air support.
And what, in the midst of all this, became of the political
settlement called for by the Paris accords? President Thieu, falsely
believing in continued American support, spurned it; the communists,
alleging American-South Vietnamese sabotage of the agreements,
announced a policy of "revolutionary violence" — that is, war — in
the South.
After setting the stage for South Vietnam's eventual descent into
the nightmare of defeat, Isaacs detours to consider American policy
in Laos and Cambodia, two American client nations deeply involved
in the Indochina war but hardly mentioned in the Paris accords.
Laos, a backward, inherently pacific country, borders North Vietnam
on the east; the communists had long used it as a supply and staging
area for their war to the south. Since the early 1960s the U.S. had
bombed communist targets in Laos, and the bombing increased
sharply under Nixon. In the period up to 1969, 454,998 tons of
explosives had been dropped; between 1969 and 1973 the tonnage
was 1,637,902, an amount equal to the total dropped by the U.S.
during the entirety of World War II. The resultant devastation was
massive. Equally dreadful was the virtual destruction of the Hmong,
tribal hill dwellers whose young men, and later mere boys, were
secretly recruited by the U.S. to fight against Laotian communists.
The Hmong, stigmatized by this relationship, were finally forced to
flee their hills and become miserable, disease-ridden refugees. In the
end Laos's fate would be tied to South Vietnam's: in 1975, despite the
once-heavy American involvement, the communists in Laos triumphed.
Cambodia's fate, according to Isaacs, was worse. Until the
1970s, under its ruler Prince Norodom Sihanouk, it managed to
remain neutral, its population contented if not prosperous. However
the price of neutrality was the accomodation of Vietnamese communist
sanctuaries. These became the target of Richard Nixon's secret
bombing policy beginning in March 1969, and his April 1970 land
"incursion" which, in Isaacs' opinion, undermined Cambodia's
fragile neutrality. Although he holds Sihanouk responsible for his
own decline and fall in 1970, Isaacs faults the U.S. for encouraging
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the succeeeding pro-American government of Lon Nol to widen its
military efforts against the Vietnamese communists. The results were
disastrous; the Cambodian army, as corrupt and inefficient as the
South Vietnamese, proved ineffective. The growing war thoroughly
disrupted Cambodian civil life and choked the capital, Phnom Penh,
with refugees. The Khmer Rouge communist insurgency, once small,
grew, and a combination of revolutionary fanaticism and traditional
hatred of the Vietnamese placed it beyond Hanoi's control after the
Paris accords were signed. The U.S. responded with bombing of
unbelievable intensity. In six months of 1973 more American bombs
fell on Cambodia than had fallen on Japan during all of the Pacific
war. The bombing campaign appeared devoid of rational objective;
foreign diplomats in Phnom Penh and not a few Americans thought
the U.S. had gone mad. "More and more," comments Isaacs, "the
bombing seemed to take on a quality of rage," And since it was now
directed at heavily populated areas, Cambodian society was further
rent. Despite the bombing, however, the military situation continued
to deteriorate; the communists by 1975 held four-fifths of Cambodia.
Hundreds of millions of dollars in American military aid were
squandered by ineptitude before Cambodia, merely a "sideshow" in
the Indochina war, would slide on its own into the madness of Khmer
Rouge despotism, "a victim of blind forces it had not created or
controlled or even understood."
The fall of Cambodia, in Isaac's retelling, has an air of eerie
unreality to it, and this is even more the case with his description of
the fall of South Vietnam, which occupies the last two-fifths of his
book. By the summer of 1974 the North Vietnamese, in clear
violation of the cease-fire, began engaging in offensive operations;
the South Vietnamese army, in the face of shrinking U.S. aid, could
only counter defensively. By this time the South Vietnamese economy
was a shambles, the civilian population thoroughly demoralized. Yet
Kissinger, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, and other Washington officials continued to exude untiring optimism. Undoubtedly
they were in part influenced by Ambassador Graham Martin's
misleadingly cheery reports, and so may have been the South
Vietnamese leadership to whom the Ambassador gave repeated and
unjustified assurances of continuing U.S. aid. On August 6 the
Congress cut military aid to South Vietnam; three days later Richard
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Nixon, who had promised to stand behind President Thieu, resigned.
Within a year, Thieu himself, and all he represented, would be swept
away.
Thieu's end began with public protests against official corruption
in the midst of national distress. The protests, which grew despite —
or perhaps because of — government concessions, inspired the
communists to abandon any remaining thought of negotiations in
favor of all-out military victory. By year's end the Saigon army,
losing men and material at what Isaacs calls "a fearful rate," began to
crumble. The following March the communist offensive commenced
in earnest; the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam began its
apocalyptic retreat to and abandonment of Saigon. Morale, civilian
and military, evaporated as city after city fell; it is Isaacs' important
observation that, in this extremity, "the Saigon regime could find no
reserve of will largely because it had no relation to its own people."
Predictably, realism still eluded American officials; the U.S. charge
d'affaires in Saigon insisted that the communists lacked the capability
to attack the capital and urged American businessmen there to
expand their enterprises and encourage further investment. In early
April General Frederick Weyand, sent by President Ford on a factfinding mission, advocated $727 million in miltary aid to Saigon, as if
weaponry could counter moral bankruptcy. There is a significant
lesson here, Isaacs tells us: senior U.S. military officials could not
admit that "South Vietnam's collapse had moral and not just material
causes." To do so would acknowledge that there was no American
remedy for Vietnam's defeat, that America's "can do" spirit was
unavailing.
Isaacs' gripping account of Saignon's final days can scarcely be
summarized; it must be read to be appreciated. Its lessons are those
which pertain to the outer limits of human behavior under incredible
stress, danger, and disorder, rather than to international politics. But
the author concludes with a judgment that, while not new, is worth
re-emphasizing: "what the United States really lacked in Vietnam was
not persistence but understanding. . . . From start to finish American leaders remained catastrophically ignorant of Vietnamese
history, culture, values, motives, and abilities." It is a lesson to
remember the next time a voice from Washington, oozing sincerity
and confidence, calls the nation to another foreign adventure.
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